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frankly, in the egoistic. It indicates a subconscious determining concern with one's self. It is a reversed romanticism. Romanticism avowedly begins with the life of emotion and desire set over against the structure and system of the world. Out of the material of fancy and desire it builds another world which it asserts is the truly real world because it is the ideal world. One who becomes aware of the insolent egotism, the unbridled immaturity of such an attitude, and who contemplates the havoc which has been wrought by neglect of the conditions of life and action, naturally turns to contemplation of the order of the world. This order fixes the limits of legitimate imagination and will; its contemplation secures attainment of insight in a sure and elevated happiness.

Such an one becomes, in short, a classicist. Measure, order, proportion, limit, is the nature of the world, and reason is the voluntary perception and intelligent adoption of measure as the rule of life. Instinct, fancy, aspiring desire, is the great enemy. But unconscious antique classicism was a spontaneous response to the conditions of life in days when things seemed to have no possibilities except such as were realized in the cycle of nature without the participation of human choice and effort. It was rooted in a view of finite, finished possibilities of the world. It did not spring from any consideration of our possibilities. It was innocent of the thought of the claims, limited or unlimited, of the self. To recover such classicism by beginning with the thought of the possibilities of desire and choice, with the thought, disguised, of the ego is impossible. The attempt violates the principle of regard for conditions, for structure, which is the essence of classicism. For it ignores the conditions under which the classic spirit was a spontaneous response to nature itself. For this reason, I have called modern class-conscious classicism a reversed romanticism. It is evangelical, not spontaneous, for it is preoccupied with salvation. The fact that its conception of salvation is reasonable while that of romanticism is fantastic does not alter the preoccupation. It only changes the spirit of ancient art into a gospel of the estheticism of secluded knowledge.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Morale: The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct. G. STANLEY HALL. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1920. Pp. ix + 378.

The substance of this book was given in weekly lectures in Clark

University during the year 1918-19. About one-half of the chapters interpret the psychology of morale, as observed during the war; the remainder, with occasional reference to morale, discuss many of the more important moral and social questions of the present time. The date when the book was written probably explains the sweeping claim of the sub-title, repeated in the first chapter; important as was the part that "morale" played in the war, the author might be less likely to-day to designate it as the supreme ethical standard to which conscience, duty, justice, happiness and other values of traditional ethics should be subordinated.

The portion of the book which will probably prove to be of most permanent value (chapters II-XII) consists of a very clear, concise, and virtually contemporary report of the problems of the army and the nation during the war, interpreted by an eminent psychologist, with frequent citations of the literature of the subject. The factors analyzed include: food, rest, and sleep; the conquest of fear; the rôle of anger; the attitude toward death; the function of humor and diversions in general; of placards, slogans and decorations; sex; the influence of good women; news and propaganda; espionage; personnel work and mental tests; rehabilitation of the wounded; means used for developing morale in training camps; and the influence of ideals. The general reader who desires accurate information on these topics will enjoy the book, which will also be of lasting worth to the psychologist and the historian.

The remainder of the book discusses labor, prohibition, profiteering, feminism, education, statesmanship, radical agitation, and religion. Dr. Hall's frank statements of his personal opinions on these topics are suggestive and thought provoking. For instance, while he praises the present activity in applied psychology, he is apprehensive that the psychology may become merely ancillary to business, and substitute *Kultur* for culture (pp. 167-172, 279, ff.). He believes that more light upon the basal human impulses in modern social and economic life can often be found in the more concrete reports of writers like Carleton Parker and Ordway Tead than in more scientifically psychological works (pp. 202 ff.). He thinks that the sudden advent of prohibition is responsible for much industrial restlessness, and that the remedy is to be found in new and legitimate modes of excitement and conviviality. He repeatedly urges that more serious and sympathetic study be given to the conditions that give rise to radical propaganda, in order to remedy them. "The ultimate goal of the whole feminist movement is more independence, initiative and control [of woman] over her reproductive and domestic life" (p. 254).

Though commending eugenics and birth control, he thinks that the time has not yet arrived for any general propaganda in favor of contraceptive methods (p. 256). He believes that divorce by mutual consent should be legally permitted (p. 269). In education he says more emphasis should be given to interest—a familiar saying—and also to mechanical drill and discipline (pp. 273 ff.)—an injunction not so common. No one's higher education is complete until he has done an independent bit of research (p. 282)—welcome words in these days when many complain of Ph. D. requirements. We need a new religion, free from dogma, that will hearten us to withstand "the most subtle and inveterate foe of all civilization, *viz.*: the degeneration that comes from selfishness" (p. 368).

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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1919-1920. New Series, Vol. XX. London: Williams and Norgate. Pp. iv + 314.

This volume of *Proceedings* offers rather less than usual. The papers are varied in subject, but seldom profound in treatment. Three symposia are reprinted here, two of them from the Oxford Congress of September, 1920, the other an Aristotelian Society debate, but all three rather futile. The Oxford Congress symposium on "The Problem of Nationality" is readable, however, with the paper by M. Marcel Mauss probably the best.

The single papers are as follows: Mr. James Ward's presidential address is his customary attack on the Absolute. A paper entitled, "The Nature of Inference," by Mr. Gerald Cator, contains some sugar plums of epigram in a pudding of confusion. "The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile," by Mr. J. A. Smith, accomplishes its purpose of exciting interest in Gentile. The author describes Croce as approaching philosophy through a consideration of human history, Gentile through the theory of education. But the result is not so very different, for the history of the human mind is for Gentile the history of its education, and that in turn is identical with the history of philosophy, which is philosophy itself. It would be of interest to compare Gentile with John Dewey's conception of philosophy in his *Democracy and Education*. In the next paper Mr. Alexander Shand criticizes Drever and McDougall, and maintains that impulse, instinct, and emotion should be distinguished, and not identified. Shand is always worth while. Mr. Morris Ginsberg contributes a criticism chiefly of Bosanquet's theory of "the general will." Mr. Clement C. J. Webb, in a